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STATE AND NATION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
Louis B. BOUDIN
One of the fundamental problems in a federal system is the
problem who should have the deciding voice in the question of the
division of power between the State and the Nation. This prob-
lem is twofold: First: Is this question to be decided by the com-
ponent "states" or by the nation or confederacy as a whole?
Second: What organ - legislative, executive, or judicial, -
should be entitled to speak in the name of the deciding authority,
whether that be "state" or "nation"? It is generally assumed
that the United States Constitution has solved this problem by
giving the United States Supreme Court final authority to decide
all questions arising out of the distribution of power between
State and Nation, just as it has given it the power to decide all
questions arising out of the distribution of power in the Federal
government itself between its legislative, executive, and judicial
organs. Both branches of this assumption are, in my opinion,
erroneous. In my Government by Judiciary I have endeavored to
prove, by an examination of the history of the United States Con-
stitution, and of the history of the United States under the Con-
stitution, that our present system of government, which is vir-
tually a Government by Judiciary, instead of a government by
the people as is commonly supposed, was not authorized by the
Constitution, and was not foreseen by its framers or early inter-
preters. That work has dealt, however, primarily, with the ques-
tion of the distribution of power within the federal government
itself, and within the states themselves as far as judicial control
is concerned, and only touched incidentally upon the problem of
* Member of the New York Bar,
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2 STATE AND NATION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
distribution of power between State and Nation, - this problem
being touched upon only insofar as it illustrates the main question
of judicial control of the legislative and executive departments in
our system of government. This led to some curious misunder-
standings as to my position on the question of the proper method
of determining the distribution of power between State and
Nation.1 I am therefore grateful for the opportunity given me in
this article of clarifying my position on this subject. It is the
purpose of this article to treat this subject, as far as possible, with-
out complicating it with the greater problem discussed in my
Government by Judiciary. I must, therefore, refer my readers
to that work for any phase of the subject which involves the major
question of our constitutional system.
I
At the. very outset of any discussion of the problem of the
distribution of the powers of government, we are met with the as-
sumption, prevalent alike among lawyers and historians, that the
distribution of the powers of government is a concomitant of
modern democracy. Nothing could be further from the truth. The
fact is that the notion of the distribution of the powers of govern-
ment is a survival of the Middie Ages, when the notion of modern
democracy, which is based on the sovereignty of the people, was
utterly unknown. When, in fact, the very notion of government,
in the modern sense of that word, was unknown. We cannot here
go into any lengthy discussion of the notions of government prev-
alent in the Midde Ages. Nor of the various stages on the road
which'the western world has travelled intellectually from those
notions to the conception of democracy which now prevails in such
countries as England, where government, at least formally, ex-
1One reviewer of my "IGovernment by Judiciary" seemed to think that I
was writing an anti-Federalist treatise but did not quite succeed. Another
one was puzzled over the high praise which I gave to Marshal's opinion in
MceCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579 (1819), although opposed
to the line of cases, discussed further below in the text, dealing with the
exemption from taxation of so-called "governmental instrumentalities".
This reviewer, although a professor of government in one of our leading uni-
versities, evidently could not see the difference between the necessity for the
Federal Government to possess the power to resist encroachments of the states
on the proper federal domain, and the necessity of such power being exercised
by the courts in the absence of any other instrumentality whereby such en-
croachinents could be prevented, on the one hand, and the right of an in-
dividual or private corporation to claim exemption from state taxation because
such taxation infringes upon the prerogatives of the Federal Government, or
exemption from federal taxation on the ground that such taxation infringes
upon the prerogatives of the states, on the other hand.
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presses the will of the people. Suffice it to say, that the basic
notion by which the relations between individuals and groups com-
posing society were regulated, was that of compact or contract, -
a notion that is the very antithesis of the modern notion of the
sovereignty of the people.2 The road from the mediaeval system
of social relations based on contract to the system of government
based on the sovereignty of the people had two main divisions.
The first division consisted of the building up of the notion of
sovereignty, and was itself subdivided into two divisions, usually
running concurrently: That of the emergence of the territorial
entity and intellectual concept of the nation; and that of the emer-
gence of the institution of absolute monarchy as representing the
nation. The other half of the road led through the various stages
of transference of power from the absolute monarchy to the
people, which took the form of "constitutional limitations" upon
the will of the monarch. The first important transfer of power
from the monarch to the people was the power of making laws.3
Thus arose the first distribution of the powers of government, -
that between legislative and executive. The legislature was to
2 The prevailing opinion that the notion of the "Isocial contract" was flrst
developed by Rousseau is entirely erroneous as far as its basic idea is con-
cerned, - namely, the idea that government is the result of contract. As
a matter of fact, the idea of contract as the basis of social relations is the
basic idea upon which all social and governmental relations in the Middle
Ages were founded. The only difference between the basic idea of the Mid-
die Ages and that of Rousseau consisted in the fact that during the Middle
Ages, when the notion of "government" as such was unknown, social rela-
tions were supposed to be based on individual contracts, while Rousseau, liv-
ing in a period when the notion of government was completely developed, con-
ceived of this contract as involving society as a whole instead of being an
individual contract between a particular person and his lord or master. The
idea of government involved in the social contract was new, although not
invented by Rousseau. But the idea of "contract", which is supposed to be
the distinctive Rousseau-ist idea, was merely a carry-over from medieval
times when it embraced the entire domain of social relations, including what
we now call government. A curious illustration of this idea of contract or
agreement as the basis of government during the Middle Ages is shown by
the legal notion of English law, which survived into modern times, that one
could not be tried for a crime unless he consented to enter a plea. The basis
of this curious notion was the idea that no one could be tried by any tribunal
unless he agreed to such trial, - the plea being the formal consent to such
trial. And back of that was the notion that no power could be exercised by
any person or body of persons over another except as the result of some
previous consent or agreement.
3 The notion of law-mahing in the modern sense was utterly unknown in the
Middle Ages. Social relations, as stated in the preceding footnote, were sup-
posed to be governed by contracts, - usually contracts supposedly made at
some previous time. Whenever the notion of law as such was involved, it was
"The Law", - and was usually the result of an agreement between those
subject to the law and some divine force: like "The Law-" of the Jews
3
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4 STATE AND NATION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
make the laws; while the executive was to govern according to the
laws thus made. At that period the judiciary was still part of the
executive, and but the instrument and servant of the executive.
In the struggle that ensued in England, the mother of modern
democracy, between the legislature as representative of the people
and the monarch, the judiciary gradually emerged as a semi-
independent organ of government. This gave Montesquieu, work-
ing for the introduction into France of the rudiments of modern
democracy then already established in England, his opportunity
of proclaiming the three-fold division of the powers of govern-
ment with which'we are familiar, as the true form of "free" gov-
ernment.4  Montesquieu's assertion that such was then the actual
distribution of the powers of government in England was entirely
unfounded, as is well known to all students of the condition of
England at the time when Mlontesquieu wrote his Esprit des Lois.
And the history of the western world since Montesquieu wrote his
great work has proven that a real distribution of the powers of
government is neither feasible nor desirable under the complex
conditions of what we call Modern Civilization.
which was the result of a compact between Jehovah and his Chosen People.
The Law was therefore immutable, - and the notion of the continual mak-
ing of laws by ordinary mortals was contrary to the very notion of The Law.
This notion of law was well suited to an unchanging or slow-changing social
system, in which the law if it changed at all, changed by such small degrees
as to be imperceptible. The notion of law as being made as we go along to
meet changing conditions is the result of our modern world, which has devel-
oped since the disappearance of the practically stagnant society of the Mid-
dle Ages. And it is curious that as late as the early seventeenth century
there were still outstanding English lawyers who conceived of law as some-
thing immutable. Such, for instance, was Coke's notion of the common law.
4 Besides the assumption that the distribution of powers generally is favor-
able to liberty, noted in note 6, infra, there is a special belief generally
entertained that the independence of the judiciary is favorable to liberty.
This belief is entirely erroneous, and is a generalization founded on the con-
sideration of a small segment of English history, when "independence"
meant independence of the Crown, at a time when the people were engaged
in a struggle with the Crown and endeavoring to limit its powers. Before,
therefore, the question as to whether or not the independence of the judiciary
is 'favorable to liberty can be determined, the question m st be put and
answered: independent of whom? If of the Crown, the answer is: Yes. If
of the people, the answer is emphatically: No. In this connection it is well
to recall a curious and rather instructive instance of an attempt to create an
independent judiciary in France, at about the time Coke was trying to estab-
lish one in England, known as the Pavlete. In 1604 the great King Henry
IV of France determined to convert the judicial offices of France into herit-
able property. In consideration of certain payments, the judicial offices were
to be confirmed to the then holders as heritable property, descending to their
heirs, with the right to bequeath by will, subject to the sole provision that
the new owner should prove himself qualified. "The measure", says a noted
historian, "was expected to create a caste of magistrates, proud of their
independence and of their traditions".
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In England itself, the course of historical development has
gone from a distribution to a unification of the powers of govern-
ment. Whatever may have been the true condition of England
about the middle of the eighteenth century, there can be no doubt
of the fact that in the twentieth century the English are sovereign,
and that the power of the English Parliament, as the representa-
tive of the English people, is unlimited. The English legislature
has absorbed all the powers which formerly resided in the other
organs of government, and today the English executive and the
English judiciary have only such powers as the legislature may
be willing to let them have either by. specific grant or by
acquiescence in powers actually exercised. That a real distribu-
tion of powers is impossible under modern conditions is also proven
by the history of the United States. In this country, there has been
no formal unification of power such as has taken place in Eng-
land. But, as I have shown elsewhere, the distribution of powers
in this country is purely formal, and the real power of goverm-
ment, that is to say, - the ultimate decision of all important
questions, - resides in the judiciary. This is proven by the fact
that it is the judiciary that determines what powers the legislature
and the executive may possess. For the test of all true power
in any system of government is not what power is actually exer-
cised by its various organs but what organ determines in the last
resort upon the distribution of power, - who has the right to
decide upon the limits of power of the various organs of. govern-
ment. This power to decide upon the distribution of power among
the organs of government, - what the Germans call Kompetenz
der Kompetenz, - is the true touchstone of the power of sov-
ereignty. In England, and in all other modern democracies ex-
cept the United States, that power resides in the legislature. In
the United States that power resides in the judiciary., It may,
therefore, safely be said that the distribution of powers of govern-
ment has proven itself impossible in the modern world. Whether
or not it is desirable that this unified power should be lodged in
the legislature, is a problem with which we are not concerned
here, and has been dealt with by me at some length elsewhere."
See BouDnw, GOvERNmENT BY JUDICIARY (2 vols. 1932).0 The question of the desirability of the distribution of powers generally
is obscured by the fact that in autocracies there is no such distribution, and
that in some countries in which apparently some form of democracy or free-
dom prevails there is such a distribution. Such, for instance, are the so-
called "democracies" of the Middle Ages, and some of their modern sur-
5
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6 STATE AND NATION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
The foregoing discussion relates to the distribution of powers
of government generally. But it applies very largely also to the
distribution of powers between "state" and "nation" in a federal
government. To begin with, it applies to the failure of the fram-
ers of the United States Constitution to provide "controls": for
there are no controls either as between the different organs of the
federal government, or as between nation and states. The United
States Constitution prescribes the respective powers of the federal
legislature, the federal executive, and the federal judiciary; but
it does not provide for the manner of the settlement of disputes
in case of collision between these departments. We need not re-
hearse here the contradictory inferences drawn from this lack of
provision by various historians and the various schools of thought
in the domain of our constitutional law. We know how history
has solved the problem, and we also know that this solution is
not in consonance with the opinions of at least some of the framers.
We also know that this solution was not adopted until after a long
struggle, in which such noted figures in our history as Jefferson
and Jackson among Presidents and an array of noted names among
lawyers and judges were ranged on the other side.
The situation is duplicated in the case of the question of the
distribution of powers between states and nation, - with one
notable exception which merely adds to the proof of the futility
of a formal distribution of the powers of government on paper.
The United States Constitution itself prescribes for the distribu-
tion of powers between the Federal Government and the State
Government by enumerating the powers of the first and infer-
entially leaving all other powers to the second. And the Tenth
Amendment specifically provides that all powers not granted to
the Federal Government belong to the States. But neither the
vivors. An examination of these will show, however, that these "1democracies"
were not really democratic, and that the "freedoms" enjoyed by some of
the social groups in these alleged democracies were really privileges, -
privileges utterly incompatible with real democracy, which is based on the
sovereignty of the people. A true evaluation of the desirability of the dis-
tribution of the powers of government is also hampered by the prevalent
notion that "the less government the better". The distribution of the
powers of government tends to "lessen" government by preventing quick
and unified action. But the notion of the "less government the better", al-
though a modern notion, in this form at least, really feeds on two sources:
One of these is a lingering survival of the medieval notion of an unchanging
society; the other is the notion of a harmonized stability of the "natural"
economic order involved in the doctrine of laissez faire. But even this modem
doctrine will be found, on further analysis, to be twin-sister to the doctrine
of a closed system of law which was involved in the medieval notion of The
Law.
6
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Constitution itself nor the Tenth Amendment says who should
decide in case of conflict between state and nation: either as to
which government should decide, or as to what organ of either
government should be the organ of decision.
To us, at the end of the course of development which lasted
nearly a century and a half and involving one actual and several
potential civil wars, the actual historical solution that the
Kompetenz der Kompetenz resides in the judicial branch of the
Federal Government seems a matter of course. But a study of
our history will show that this solution was stubbornly resisted
for about one half of our existence under the Constitution, and
that many of our statesmen, among them some of our most noted
judges, could find nothing in the Constitution to justify it. Since
the Civil War, at least, there has been no serious attempt to dis-
pute the power of the Federal Government to decide on the dis-
tribution of power between itself and the States; and, since by
the time the Civil War was over the judiciary was fairly well on
the road of its ascendency over the legislative and executive de-
partments, the right of the United States Supreme Court to de-
termine this question along with the other questions of distribution
of powers of government came to be taken for granted. But a
glance at our judicial history will show that there is considerable
force on the other side of the argument; and an examination of
current judicial decisions will show that our actual solution was
less than fortunate.
In order to avoid misunderstanding, I would like to state
right here that I personally believe that the National Government
must, and should, have the power of determining any dispute as
to sphere of competency between itself and the States. Further-
more, I believe that many more things than are now within the
sphere of competency of the National Government should be with-
in it. But historical truth compels me to state that very few of the
"framers" shared my -view on the second half of the question, at
least, and that the views of those of the framers who did agree
with me on the subject did not prevail in the Constitutional Con-
vention.7 As to the first half of the question, it is anybody's guess
as to what the real intentions of the framers were. The chances
are that there was no consensus of opinion on the subject, - that
there were many divergent currents of opinion within the Consti-
7The current view, due largely to the influence of the writings of Dr.
,Charles A. Beard, that the Constitution was the result of the activities of
.reactionaries led by Alexander Hamilton, is, in my opinion, entirely erron-
eous. See op. cit. supra n. 5, vol. 1, appendix D.
7
Boudin: State and Nation in a Federal System
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1934
8 STATE AND NATION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
tutional Convention, and that the framers considered it prudent
to say nothing about it, for fear that any attempt to say some-
thing would render abortive the attempt to frame any constitu-
tion. It must also be conceded that the failure to specifically name
the organ of the Federal Government which is to have the power
of determination in this respect, - assuming that that determina-
tion properly belongs to the Federal Government, - naturally
led to the assumption of power by the federal judiciary, which
was the only department of the Federal Government furnished
with the mechanism for such an assumption of power. And that in
this respect the actual use of the power by the federal judiciary is
not subject to some of the serious objections to which its power
over the federal legislature and executive is subject. There cer-
tainly can be no question of the usurpation of power here. Al-
though there may be injudicious use of power, and at times abuse
of power, as there certainly has been during the past thirty or
forty years under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In considering these matters we must remember that the
framers could not possibly foresee the Fourteenth Amendment.
But this illustrates the danger of leaving such matters unprovided
for. There can be no doubt that had the United States Constitu-
tion expressly placed the function of guarding against infractions
by the State of the Federal Constitution where it belongs, none of
the abuses under the due process clause would have been possible.
II
"Of all sad words of tongue or pen,
The saddest are these: 'It might have been!' "
-JOHN GREENLEAF WHITTIER.
The sad fact is that the Constitution made no provision of
any kind in this respect. This created the impression that the
states were "sovereign", and that they were, in a sense, equal to
the nation from a constitutional point of view. The way it is
usually put is, that each is "supreme in its own sphere". This
sounds very good, - provided there is an outside power which can
decide as to what is meant in each case by "its own sphere".
Where there is no such outside power, - and in the nature of
things there can not be, - that power is really supreme which has
the power to decide what is the sphere in which each is to be
supreme. If there is doubt as to which power has the power of
8
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decision in this respect, there will be stalemate or conflict. That
was usually the situation in the Middle Ages. A situation which
was tolerated because in a stationary or slow-moving society the
power of tradition and the dangerous consequences of conflict usu-
ally lead to adjustment. When adjustment fails there is conflict,-
which largely accounts for the almost continuous state of war
which prevailed in the Middle Ages.-
When social progress assumed a faster pace, permanent
organs of decision emerged through the growth of nations, - the
"equality" between the component parts and the entity embracing
them, which was the normal condition in the Middle Ages, beig
destroyed forever. It was, therefore, inevitable, as well as desir-
able, if this country were to keep abreast of modern progress, that
the nation should assume the right to decide in all disputes as to
spheres of competence between itself and the States, no matter
what the true meaning of the United States Constitution in this
respect. Unfortunately, the Nationalists, or Federalists as they
were then called, speaking through John Marshall, had announced
an official constitutional theory which put obstacles in the course
of this development. This is the official theory upon which the
Judicial Power, - which is the central point of our constitutional
system, - is based, namely, the theory that an act of legislation
in contravention of the Constitution is a nullity. I have elsewhere
shown the absurd consequences to which this theory is bound to
lead. As regards the question now in hand, the absurdity of this
8 The complete misunderstanding which prevails generally with respect to
the life of the Middle Ages and the then prevalent notions of law, order,
and right, is best exemplified by the usual references of the modern historians
to the lawlessness of the Middle Ages because of the prevalence of private
war. But private war was a "right" in the Middle Ages, and use of that
right was no more considered lawless in the Middle Ages than the use of the
right of workers to "strike", or of employers to "lock out" their workers,
in our modern economic system. In this connection it is interesting to note
that one of the "rights" recognized in medieval times was that of a noble
vassal to renounce allegiance to his king and then make war upon him, -
much as workers now claim the right to cease working for their employer and
engage in a strike so as to prevent others from taking their place. A noble
vassal who had thus levied war upon his king was not considered a traitor,
as he would be in modern society, but as one who was engaged in exercising
a right recognized by the social system of which both he and his king were a
part. It is also well to remember that the notion of a "national interest",
for which nations are supposed to war in modern times, was utterly unknown
in the Middle Ages. Wars were not between nations but between individuals,
and in vindication not of "national interests" but of strictly individual
"rights". Whatever may have been the real underlying causes for the One
Hundred Years War between England and France, for instance, - the formal
reason for the war was the attempt of the kings of England to vindicate their
rights to the crown of France.
9
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theory is illustrated by the very case which established the supre-
macy of the Nation over the State and the judiciary as the organ
of the Federal Government through which this supremacy is to be
maintained. That is the case known to fame as Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee.9
This celebrated case was decided in 1816, but it was the culmi-
nation point of litigation going as far back as 1791. It involved
the very valuable stretch of territory in Virginia known as the
Northern Neck, and throughout its long progress it excited con-
siderable feeling in Virginia. Its final decision almost produced
a national crisis, and the crisis was only averted by the fact that
the United States Supreme Court, after making a brave announce-
ment of national supremacy, retired from the contest, as far as
the ease is concerned, leaving the field of battle in the hands of
the enemy.
The facts in the case were as follows: Lord Fairfax, the owner
of the land in question, died during the Revoluntionary War, de-
vising his lands to a nephew named Denny Martin, an English-
man. Under a law of Virginia passed during the Revolution, an
alien could not inherit lands in Virginia. The State of Virginia,
therefore, claimed that this tract of land had escheated to the State
upon Lord Fairfax's death, and proceeded to parcel it out and
to convey it by letters patent to various persons, conveying one
part to one Hunter, who leased it to the defendant in the case.
After the war, the land was claimed by Denny Martin, the plain-
tiff in the case, and certain Americans under him, among them
some of John Marshall's family, who had acted as agents for Lord
Fairfax. The legal question involved in the case was, - whether
Denny Martin could inherit the lands in question under the devise
contained in Lord Fairfax's will notwithstanding the Virginia
statute to the contrary. It was claimed, on Martin's behalf, that
under the Treaty of Peace with England of 1783, and the subse-
quent Treaty of 1794, the so-called Jay Treaty, the Virginia
statute could not operate as against him. The highest court of
Virginia finally decided, in 1810, against this contention, and
against the title of Denny Martin and those claiming under him,
giving judgment in favor of the defendant in the case, who
claimed under the grant from the State, on the theory that the
lands had escheated to !he State under the statute against inherit-
ance by aliens. Martin thereupon appealed to the United States
9 1 Wheat. 304, 4 L. ed. 97 (1813).
10
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Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme Court, by h de-
cision rendered in 1813, reversed the decision of the Virginia
courts, holding that because of the treaties in question Martin's
title to the land was good. The opinion in this case was written
by Mr. Justice Story. Mr. Justice Johnson dissented. The
Supreme Court then sent its mandate to the Court of Appeals of
Virginia, directing it to give judgment in favor of Martin.0
When the mandate reached the Court of Appeals of Virginia,
that court refused to obey, claiming that the United States Su-
preme Court had no jurisdiction in ,the premises, and relying upon
the nullity theory advanced in Marbury v. Madison for its justifi-
cation.
It will be recalled that at its first session under the Constitu-
tion, the United States Congress passed the Judiciary Act under
which the judicial system of the United States was organized.
Section 13 of that Act gave the United States Supreme Court
jurisdiction in cases of mandamus. It also contained a section,
section 25, which gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
from certain decisions of the courts of the several States. In Aar-
bury v. Madison, Marshall claimed that the Constitution did not
give the United States Supreme Court jurisdiction in cases of
mandamus, and that the provisions of the Judiciary Act which
gave the Supreme Court such jurisdiction were, therefore, a nullity.
The Virginia Court of Appeals now claimed that the United States
Constitution did not give the federal judiciary the right to hear
appeals from decisions of state courts, and that the provisions of
section 25 of the Judiciary Act, giving the Supreme Court that
right, were, therefore, a nullity. From the point of view of logic,
the argument was unanswerable: John Marshall, in Marbury 'V.
Madison, did not claim that the United States Constitution gave
the Supreme Court the power to declare laws unconstitutional.
But merely that the law of Congress involved in the Marbury
case being in excess of the powers granted to Congress by the
United States Constitution was a nullity. If this theory be cor-
rect, then disobedience to an unconstitutional law is not only the
right but the duty of every person who may be called upon to act
under the same. And Associate Justice Wilson of the United
States Supreme Court so taught in his famous Lectures on the
Law. The Virginia Court of Appeals now claimed this right, and
asserted its duty to disobey a mandate of the United States Su-
10 Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 602, 3 L. ed. 453 41812).
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preme Court given in pursuance to a law of Congress which it, the
Virginia Court of Appeals, considered unconstitutional and, there-
fore, a nullity.
Peculiar interest attaches to the position of the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, because that Court was presided over at the
time by Judge Roane, who would have been Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court instead of John Marshall, had the
vacancy in that office occurred a year later than it actually did,
and the office filled by Thomas Jefferson instead of John Adams.
The man who might have been Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court and was actually Chief Judge of the Virginia
Court of Appeals, now said:
"Upon the whole, I am of opinion, that the Constitution
confers no power upon the Supreme Court of the United
States, to meddle with the judgment of this Court, in the case
before it; that this case does not come within the actual pro-
visions of the twenty-fifth section of the judicial act; and that
this court is both at liberty, and is bound to follow its own
convictions on the subject, anything in the decisions, or sup-
posed decisions of any other court, to the contrary notwith-
standing."
In this view, all of the other Judges of the Virginia Court of
Appeals concurred, and the official judgment of that court was as
follows:
"The court is unanimously of the opinion, that the ap-
pellate power of the Supreme Court of the United States, does
not extend to this court, under a sound construction of the
constitution of the United States; - that so much of the 25th
section of the act of congress, to establish the judicial courts
of the United States, as extends the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to this court, is not in pursuance of the
constitution of the United States; that the writ of error in
this cause was improvidently allowed under the authority of
that act; that the proceedings thereon in the Supreme Court
were coram non judice in relation to this court; and that obed-
ience to its mandate be declined by this court."
Denny Martin thereupon again appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. And the United States Supreme Court now de-
cided that not only did it have the right to hear and determine
appeals from the state courts in the cases provided by Section 25
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, but also that the state courts must
follow its decisions even though they believed such decisions er-
roneous, and the laws under which they were rendered unconsti-
12
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tutional. This required some very curious logical acrobatics, in
the performance of which the spokesmen of the Court were not
wholly successful. The truth is, that there was no way of bridging
the yawning gulf between the decision and the theory upon which
it was supposed to be based.
Mr. Justice Johnson was in a particularly sad plight. It will
be recalled that when the original case was before the United
States Supreme Court he had dissented from the decision revers-
ing the decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals. Concededly,
the United States Supreme Court was not a Court superior to the
Virginia Court of Appeals, in the sense that appeals lay generally
from the one to the other. Concededly, the right of appeal from
the Virginia Court of Appeals to the United States Supreme Court
depended upon the State Court's decision being contrary to the
provisions of the United States Constitution. If that decision
was not contrary to the provisions of the United States Constitu-
tion the Supreme Court of the United States had no jurisdiction
in the premises, and its decision was therefore a nullity, because
contrary to the United States Constitution. Therefore, under the
accepted theory underlying the right of the judiciary to declare
laws unconstitutional, not only was the Virginia Court of Appeals
right in asserting that it cannot carry out the mandate of the
United States Supreme Court, which was contrary to its own con-
viction as to the meaning of the United States Constitution, but
Judge Johnson was bound to side with it even if he disagreed with
it on the constitutionality of Section 25 of the Judiciary Act, for
the force of the original decision of the United States Supreme
Court depended on an interpretation of the Constitution with
which he disagreed. Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Johnson now con-
curred in the decision of the United States Supreme Court.
But the United States Supreme Court itself had, in fact, made
a serious compromise, which has since been overlooked, - as it
had to be if we were to be truly a nation. That compromise con-
sisted in acting upon the strange doctrine that although the United
States Supreme Court had the right to hear appeals from the State
Courts it had no right to enforce its mandate. It is an interesting
fact in the development of our constitutional law that while Mar-
tin v. Hunter's Lessee is always referred to as the leading case
establishing the supremacy of the Federal Courts over the State
Courts in matters pertaining to the Federal constitution, very few
lawyers or teachers of law, as far as I know, ever refer to the fact
that the actual decision, as distinguished from the opinions, was a
13
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draw. The reason for the neglect of the actual decision in this
case, from the point of view of the practical lawyer, or the prac-
tical teacher of law, is obvious: that decision is not now the law;
while the opinions delivered on the occasion are the actual law of
the land, notwithstanding their lack of logic and their opposition
to the basic theory underlying our whole system of constitutional
law. In this connection the following passage from Mr. Justice
Story's opinion is particularly interesting, - for it is this passage,
and not the arguments from the text or meaning of the United
States Constitution, that gives the real reason for the ultimate
submission of the state courts to the revising power of the United
States Supreme Court. Said Mr. Justice Story:
"A motive of another kind, perfectly compatible with
the most sihcere respect for state tribunals, might induce the
grant of appellate power over their decisions. That motive is
the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions
throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within
the purview of the constitution. Judges of equaZ learning and
integrity, in different states, might differently interpret a
statute, or a treaty of the United States, or even the constitu-
tion itself. If there were no 'revising authority to control these
jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize them into
uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the
United States -would be different in different states, and might,
perhaps, never have precisely the same construction, obliga-
tion, or efficacy, in any two states. The public mischiefs that
would attend such a state of things would be truly deplorable;
and it cannot be believed that they could have escaped the en-
lightened convention which formed the constitution."1
The establishment of the right of the nation to decide upon
the distribution of powers between itself and the States was a mat-
l Mr. Justice Johnson's concurring opinion is a very remarkable document,
indeed, and should be studied very carefully by all those who are interested
in the problem here under discussion. It makes strange, though interesting,
reading at this day. Mr. Justice Johnson begins his opinion with the follow-
ing statement:
"It will be observed in this case, that the court disavows all intention
to decide on the right to issue compulsory process to the state courts;
thus leaving us, in my opinion, where the Constitution and laws place us
- supreme over persons and cases as far as our judicial powers extend,
but not asserting any compulsory control over the State Tribunals."
He then proceeded to state the dilemma as he saw it:
"On the one hand, the general government 'must cease to exist when-
ever it loses the power of protecting itself in the exercise of its constitu-
tional powers ..... On the other hand, so firmly am I persuaded that
the American people can no longer enjoy the blessings of a free govern-
ment, whenever the state sovereignties shall be prostrated at, the feet of
the general government, nor the proud consciousness of equality and
14
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ter of necessity, if medieval chaos was to be avoided and modern
progress made possible. And since no other provision had been
made in the United States Constitution, the present decision be-
came a necessity; and necessity knows no law, whether that of the
Constitution or of logic. Necessity, however, as is well-known,
makes bad law; and in this case it made some very bad law and
worse statesmanship, as our subsequent history has proven. We
need only add here, that it took nearly half a century and a civil
war before Mr. Justice Story's opinion became the unquestioned
law of the land; and that in the years immediately preceding the
Civil War, the highest courts of three States defied the United
States Supreme Court and refused to obey its decisions.12
security, any longer than the independence of judicial power shall be
maintained, consecrated and intangible, that I could borrow the language
of a celebrated orator and exclaim: 'I rejoice that Virginia has re-
sisted'."
After having thus stated the dilemma, Mr. Justice Johnson enters upon a
long argument the sum and substance of which is that while the United States
government must have the right to protect its constitutional powers, as de-
clared by the United States Supreme Court, such right cannot take the form
of having the United States Supreme Court make compulsory orders directed
to the state courts. This the United States Supreme Court refrained from
doing in the instant case, and no mandate was ever issued therein.
12 The three states in question are Ohio, Wisconsin and California. The
Ohio Supreme Court refused to recognize the validity of the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in the case of the Piequa Branch of the State
Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 369, 14 L. ed. 368 (1853), involving the
question of corporate charters. The Supreme Court of California refused to
recognize the right of appeal from the state courts to the federal courts in
the case of Johnson v. Gordon, 4 Cal. 368 (1854). The State of Wisconsin
defied the United States Supreme Court in the famous Booth Cases, 3 Wis. 1(1854), 3 Wis. 145 (1854), 3 Wis. 157 (1854), 11 Wis. 517 (1859), involving
the Fugitive Slave Law (1858). In the California case, the Supreme Court
of that state held that:
"I1. The Constitution of the United States gives no authority to the
Supreme Court of the United States to exercise appellate jurisdiction over
the State Courts, nor can such authority be derived by implication, or
construction.
"2. The State Courts and the Federal Courts are co-ordinate tribunals,
with concurrent jurisdiction in many cases, and the decision of the one
in which jurisdiction first attaches, is final and conclusive.
"13. No cause can be transferred from a State Court to any Court
of the United States.
' "4. Neither a writ of error nor appeal lies to take a case from a
State Court to the Supreme Court of the United States."
In the Booth cases, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in sustaining a writ of
habeas corpus issued out of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, setting at liberty
a man who had been indicted in the federal courts for violation of the Fugitive
Slave Law, in defiance of an express decision of the United States Supreme
Court, said:
"This Court has no disposition to interfere with the criminal juris-
diction of the District Court of the United States. Unless that Court pro-
ceeds within the limits which the constitution and laws of Congress have
prescribed, its acts are a nullity. .Its jurisdiction is always open to ques-
tion, and must affirmatively appear. If jurisdiction be wanting, its pro-
15
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III
I have said before that the decision in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee establishing in the national government the power to deter-
mine the respective spheres of competency between the State and
the Nation and placing that power in the hands of the Federal
Judiciary was a matter of historical necessity. The nature of this
necessity was, however, different in the two branches of the ques-
tion. That the ultimate decision on all questions of competency
should be in the hands of the national government is a real neces-
sity in the modern world. By that I mean that we could not have
become a really modern nation if that power had not resided in
the federal government. This is proven by the fact that such is
the rule in all modern countries having a federal form of govern-
ment. This is true even of the Swiss Confederation, - the least
national of all modern countries. Without it a country would of
necessity remain in, or elapse into, medieval chaos. On the other
hand, the placing of this power in the hands of the Judiciary, was
the purely adventitious result of the accidental or designed failure
of the United States Constitution to place this power where it
ought to be, - namely, in that branch of the government which
represents the sovereign power of the people, the national legis-
lature. That is where it is placed in most progressive constitu-
tions.13
The familiar seems "natural". To us Americans, the exer-
cise of this power by the federal judiciary seems to be the most
natural thing in the world. But a little reflection will show that
that is not so. If we do not actually become convinced to the con-
trary, we will at least have to admit that the matter is involved
in very grave doubt. But in order to be able to consider this ques-
tion in a truly unbiased manner, we must once for all divest our-
selves of our habit of thinking of all governmental problems from
the point of view of individual rights. It would be well to remem-
ber in this connection that the so-called protection of individual
rights is not in any way involved in the subject or, if at all in-
cess, judgments and decrees are void. Were it otherwise, that Court
might proceed to indict, convict and punish for common assault, libel,breaches of the peace, and so forth, imprison our citizens at its own will
and pleasure, administer the whole common law code of offenses and pun-ishments, from whose judgments there could be no appeal, and whoso
prison doors no earthy power could unlock. Such doctrine is monstrous.
We have not yet reached the point of submission."
13 See further discussion infra as to the relevant provisions of the Consti-
tutions of Switzerland, the German Republic, and the Republic of Austria,
16
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volved, plays a most insignificant role. The United States Con-
stitution as originally drawn contained no bill of rights, and its
text contains only three provisions with respect to the protection
of individuals against state-government action, - provisions which
were considered so unimportant that they were hardly debated
in the Constitutional Convention. 14 It should also be remembered
that the bill of rights, when adopted, was not meant to be a re-
striction upon the powers of the states. At. least, so the United
States Supreme Court has held, and such is the law today. The
primary question, therefore) was a distribution of the spheres of
government between the Nation and the States, and the allotment
to each of its proper sphere of competence. The danger to be
guarded against was that of encroachment by one government up-
on the proper sphere of the other, that is to say, the problem was
not one as to what should be the powers of government as such,
but which of the two governments provided for should have the
right to act in a given situation.
That there is no way of providing any absolute guarantee
against the encroachment by one government upon the proper
sphere of the other in a federal system, is conclusively established
by the history and the opinions in the Martin-Hunter litigation.
And the decision in that case, -s ultimately shaped by history, was
to the effect that because no absolute standards can be set up, the
right of decision should lie with the Nation instead of the States,
as the least hazardous course to pursue for a nation valuing its
unity and its progress. It would seem, therefore, that this power
should be entrusted to the policy-declaring branch of the national
government, rather than the branch which is occupied with decid-
ing lawsuits between individual§. Once we divest ourselves of the
false notion that we are dealing with a contract which perpetually
and of its own force, - within the confines of its own "four cor-
ners", - settles the problem, and realize that we are dealing with
a problem of policy, - a modus vivendi to be established in cases
of doubt and difference of opinion arising in the course of the
historical progress of the nation, - it becomes perfectly obvious
that we are dealing in fact with a constitution-making problem and
not a problem of deciding upon rights theretofore accrued. This
becomes perfectly clear if we bear in mind the purpose of the Con-
stitution and of the distribution of powers therein contained.
14 These are the provisions of Section 10 of Article 1, that no state shall
"pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impaiing the obligation
of contract",
17
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A glance at the United States Constitution will show that its
general purpose is to assign to the Federal Government those
"'spheres of influence" which are truly national, and to allow the
States to retain those spheres of influence in which they are most
competent to act. Such, indeed, must be the purpose of all such
documents. But this is of necessity a changing problem in a pro-
gressive society; its solution is of necessity a problem of policy
with which only the policy-making branch of the government is
competent to deal. Indeed, the great mass of litigation under the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution, to take the
most conspicuous example, and the tortuous course of judicial de-
cision thereunder, is due entirely to the fact that the judicial arm
of the government is utterly incompetent to deal with problems
which predominantly involve questions of policy.
Without going into details which will easily suggest them-
selves to anyone familiar with this branch of our Constitutional
Law, I will call attention here to two cases which arose long before
the modern avalanche of decisions under the commerce clause, -
two decisions now mostly forgotten but which excited great atten-
tion at the time they arose, and which still stand as monuments to
the unfortunate lack of foresight in the framers of the United
States Constitution, which resulted in the failure to place this
power where it properly belongs. I am referring to the Ohio River
Bridge case and the admiralty jurisdiction easesY1
In the first of these cases, the United States Supreme Court,
in a decision rendered in 1852, ordered the abatement of a rail-
road bridge over the Ohio River at Wheeling as a nuisance. The
bridge was situated in the State of Virginia, and was built under
a charter granted by that State. It was built by the railroad in-
terests, and its erection was fought by the river-traffic interests.
The legal point of attack was that its erection under state author-
ity was an infringement of the federal government's right to reg-
ulate commerce on the navigable waters of the country. Had the
decision of 'the United States Supreme Court prevailed, the ec-
onomic development of the country would have been arrested for
generations, if not forever. Fortunately, Congress, by an Act
specially passed, and unique in our history, overruled the decision
and legalized the bridge. And it is but one more illustration of
15 Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, 14
L. ed. 249 (1851); The Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 433,
13 L. ed. 1058 (1851); Jackson v. Steamboat Magnolia, 20 How. 286, 15 L.
ed. 909 (1857).
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the absurdity of our entire conception of how such things should
be dealt with, that at least one of the judges of the United States
Supreme Court, urged the Court to disregard the act of Congress
legalizing the bridge, although the original decision declaring it a
nuisance was based on the theory that Congress had the sole
authority to permit its erection.'( Passing the absurdity of this
judge's position, and reverting to the original problem as'it stood
before the Court when the matter first came before it, one may
well ask: Would it not be more logical that this problem of policy
should be regulated in the first instance by the body whose author-
ity and supposed intentions in, that regard are the decisive factor
in the situation? Lawyers will recall the numerous cases in which
astute lawyers and learned judges argued pro and con as to the
inferences to be drawn from the fact that Congress did not act in
a certain situation, or acted in a particular manner. I am sure
that the men from Mars, or from some other country on our own
globe where people are not fed at their mother's breast with the
milk of judicial decisions, would say that the only body competent
to deal with such questions is the body whose acts or intentions
are supposed to be the decisive factor in the situation.
The admiralty jurisdiction cases referred to involved the
question as to whether or not the admiralty jurisdiction of the
United States extended to the non-tidal navigable waters of the
United States. The real question, - and a very important one it
was, - was whether the admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States extended to the Great Lakes and the great river-systems of
the West. By a series of decisions; the most important one of which
was rendered in 1825 in the case of The Thomas Jefferson,17 the
United States Supreme Court had declared that the admiralty
jurisdiction of the United States as granted by the United States
Constitution was limited to tide-water, thus excluding the Great
Lakes and the great inland river-systems of this country. In two
decisions rendered in 1851 and 1858, respectively, the earlier de-
cisions were overruled, and the admiralty jurisdiction of our fed-
eral courts extended to the great avenues of trade and commerce
which had in the meantime come to play a great part in the life of
this country. Before these decisions had been rendered, Congress
had passed a law which gave the federal courts this extended jur-
isdiction, but this law was attacked as unconstitutional on the
26 Pennsylvania v. the Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 18 How. 421, 15 L.
ed. 435 (1855).
17 10 Wheat. 428, 6 L. ed. 358 (1825).
19
Boudin: State and Nation in a Federal System
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1934
20 STATE AND NATION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
ground that the extent of the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
courts had been settled by the Constitution itself. Of course, the
Constitution itself had done nothing of the kind, but what was
meant was that it was settled by the Constitution as interpreted
in the series of decisions culminating in the case In re The Thomas
Jefferson. The Supreme Court, in two remarkable decisions, -
remarkable for their boldness of attack and the absence of the
usual resort to the making of distinctions that make no difference,
- decided that a change of circumstances changed the meaning
of the Constitution. No one can quarrel with the decisions, but
one may well doubt the wisdom of leaving the decision of such
questions to a Court bound by precedent and theoretically limited
to declaring the meaning of the Constitution as it was understood
in 1787, rather than to the policy-making arm of the Federal Gov-
ernment, whose duty it is to shape the nation's policy in accord-
ance with the needs of the times.
IV
Such questions should not be decided on a priori reasoning
alone. The real test here, as elsewhere, is that of history. And
it is my considered judgment that history has pronounced against
it. This pronouncement was made in two ways: first, by exposing
the shortcomings of our system; and, second, by the lack of
significant imitation on the part of other nations. The first as-
sertion can, of course, be substantiated only by an exhaustive re-
view of the pertinent decisions and their results, which cannot,
of course, be done in the space of an article such as this. I may,
however, point to a few decisions by way of illustration, and in
order to further clarify my thought on this subject. To begin
with, there is the question of exclusiveness. Under our system,
the Courts are the exclusive organ for the review of state action.
I do not mean to insist that the legislature ought to be the ex-
clusive organ of such action. It may be advisable to permit the
Federal Courts to exercise that power where Congress had no op-
portunity to speak its mind. But the power primarily belongs to
Congress and where Congress has spoken, that should be determina-
tive of the issue. Failure to speak should, on principles recog-
nized in our courts, create a presumbtion at least that Congress
desired to give the State a free hand. On such principles, the
great welter of decisions on the subject would completely disap-
pear. The great judgment in McCulloclh v. Maryland"8 might
18 Supra n. 1.
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still be needed. But we may very well doubt whether Brown v.
Maryland9 would be necessary or should have been decided the
way it was. I do not mean to suggest that it was improperly de-
cided under our Constitution as it stands, although great and
good men have had their doubts about it, and some have changed
their opinion on the subject in the course of time, as did Chief
Justice Taney.2 0 But under a constitution as it should have been
written, the question decided in Broum v. Maryland would have
been left to Congress, and in the absence of action by Congress the
action of the State would have been permitted to stand. The
same is true of the questions involved in such cases as The Mayor
of New York V. Miln,21 The License Cases,22 and The Passenger
Cases." All of these cases involved questions of policy which
could be determined properly only by the federal legislature. It
was, therefore, a most inefficient way, to say the least, to leave the
judgment on such questions to judges who must speculate on the
true intentions of Congress in the premises.
But our actual system is not merely an inefficient way of de-
termining policy. It is that at best. At its worst it is downright
vicious. This is best illustrated by the development of our law
of taxation, which has become such a scandal that it has been
found necessary to propose a constitutional amendment to remedy
the evil. I am referring to the series of cases dealing with the
taxation, or exemption from taxation, of so-called governmental
instrumentalities. I have dealt elsewhere at some length with this
19 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. ed. 419 (1827).
20 In his capacity of Attorney General of the State, Taney argued Brown
v. Maryland, supra n. 19, on behalf of that State, contending that the Mary-
land statute there under consideration was constitutional. But he subse-
quently changed his mind on the subject. As Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court he said, in his opinion in the Lincense Cases, 5 How.
504, 575, 12 L. ed. 256 (1847), referring to Brown v. Maryland:
"I argued the case in behalf of the State, and endeavored to main-
tain that the law of Maryland, which required the importer as well as
other dealers to take out a license before he could sell, and for which he
was to pay a certain sum to the State, was valid and constitutional; and
certainly I at that time persuaded myself that I was right, and thought
the decision of the court restricted the powers of the State more than a
sound construction of the Constitution of the United States would war-
rant. But further and more mature reflection has convinced me that the
rule laid down by the Supreme Court is a just and safe one, and perhaps
the best that could have been adopted for preserving the right of the
United States on the one hand, and of the States on the other, and pre-
venting collision between them."
21 11 Pet. 102, 9 L. ed. 648 (1837).
22 5 How. 540, 12 L. ed. 272 (1847).
23 7 How. 283, 12 L. ed. 702 (1849).
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subject.24 I shall therefore limit myself here to a brief reference
to a few of the cases illustrative of the subject.
i Dobbins v. Erie,25 decided in 1842, the United States Su-
preme Court declared unauthorized a tax attempted to be collected
by a state on an internal-revenue official who had been taxed on
his office as such; on the ground that by taxing this federal official
in the form that the tax was imposed, that is to say, by taxing
the office eo nomine, the State was taxing a governmental instru-
mentality of the United States. The soundness of this decision is
open to question, but the decision is comparatively unimportant,
and of itself would merit little attention. But in 1871, in the
very important decision of Collector v. Daj,20 it was held that a
state judge is exempt from a general income tax levied by the
Federal Government, on the ground that in McCulloch v. Mary-
land and Dobbins v. Erie, it had been established that a State can-
not tax an instrumentality of the Federal Government, and that
the alleged equality of the state governments with the Federal
Government required that a similar principle should be applied to
the instrumentalities of the state governments. Since then the ex-
emptions have multiplied to such an extent that they have become
a separate branch of our law, and the amount involved in these
exemptions has beconie a serious menace to the taxation system of
the country.
The curious thing in all this is that neither the federal nor
the state governments have asked for these exemptions for in-
dividuals or private corporations, at least as far as is disclosed by
the cases. And it seems never to have occurred to any one of the
judges sitting in these cases to inquire whether the government
whose instrumentalities are supposedly being taxed, whose rights
are supposedly being infringed upon, and in order to preserve
whose rights the taxation is being invalidated, has asked for the
exemption, or is in any way interested therein.27
The fact is that the Federal Government, whose rights were
supposedly being encroached upon in the taxing of Mr. Dob-
24 Boudin, The Taxation of Governmental Instrumn6talities (1934) 22 G.o.
L. 3. 1-40, 254-292.
25 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. ed. 1022 (1842).
26 11 Wall. 113, 11 L. ed. 122 (1871).
27 In the ease of Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U. S. 216, 51 S. Ct. 125 (1930), In
which a dealer in securities sought to be exempted from general income tax
on so much of his income as was derived from dealing in municipal securities,
on the ground that municipal securities are State "governmental instru-
mentalities", two States, New York and Massachusetts, actually appeared
and filed briefs through their attorneys general as amici curiae, in opposition
22
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bins, did not object to his taxation, as far as we know. Nor has
the State of New York, whose "instrumentality" was being taxed
in Collector v. Day, and whose rights were supposed to have been
encroached upon and its sovereignty diminished by such taxation,
asked for that exemption, as far as we know.
This involves another question which we shall consider further
below, namely, at whose instance, and in the presence of what
parties, ought this question of distribution of governmental powers
between State and Nation be determined, assuming that it is to be
determined by courts! At this point, we merely desire to state
that all of this excrescence upon our constitutional law would
have been impossible had tile question been left to the determina-
tion of that branch of the government to which it properly be-
longs, - namely the legislature. It was for the federal legislature
to say, as a matter of policy, whether or not it would permit the
states to tax its officials; and it should have been left to the legis-
latures of the states to claim such exemption, assuming that the
states were entitled to it. It is interesting to note in this connec-
tion that in the first of these taxation cases, namely, Dobbins v.
Erie, the judgment was placed upon the ground that the Federal
Government through its legislature, determined what compensation
Mr. Dobbins'should get for the services he rendered to the Federal
Government, and that the state taxing powers could not, therefore,
diminish that compensation. It did not occur to the Judges of the
United States Supreme Court to ask themselves whether the Fed-
eral Legislature, whose prerogatives were supposed to have been
invaded, had objected to the invasion. But there would have been
no necessity for either asking or deciding the question, had the
matter been originally placed in the hands of the Congress for de-
termination. In countries where that is the case, no such tragically
absurd situations arise as that with which we are confronted in this
country in the domain of taxation because of the line of decisions
following Collector v. Day.
V
it is, of course, impossible in an article like this, to give even
a summary of the practices in this respect in other countries. We
to the exemption. This evidently impressed the Supreme Court, and the deci-
sion denied the exemption, at least as to securities not issued at a discount.
In the course of his opinion in this case, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes remarked:
"No state has ever appeared at 'the bar of this court to complain of this
Federal tax, and it is not without significance that in the present instance
the States of New York and Massachusetts do appear here as amici curiae in
defense of the tax".
23
Boudin: State and Nation in a Federal System
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1934
24 STATE AND NATION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
shall, therefore, only review here briefly the provisions of the three
constitutions which we consider significant in this connection.
These are: The Constitution of Switzerland, the Constitution of
the German Republic (Weimar), and the Constitution of the Re-
public of Austria.
In view of the notion prevailing in this country that some-
how the exercise of supervisory control by a federal agency other
than a court is peculiarly derogatory to the sovereignty of a State,
it is interesting to note that the Federal Constitution of Switzer-
land specifically provides that the cantons are sovereign in so far
as their sovereignty is not limited by the Federal Constitution, and
it also contains a provision similar to our Tenth Amendment, to
the effect that all powers not delegated to the federal government
are reserved to the cantons. 28 It should also be noted here that the
Swiss Constitution contains provisions similar to those contained in
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, ex-
cept that the provisions of the Swiss Constitution are couched in
much broader language and have been construed to place in the
keeping of the federal government the protection of the liberties
and rights of the individual citizens against infringement by the
cantonal governments. The Swiss Constitution also expressly pro-
vides that the Federal Tribunal, which corresponds to our Federal
Supreme Court, has the power to decide conflicts of authority be-
tween the Confederation and the canton.20
Nevertheless, the Swiss Federal Tribunal is by no means the
only, or even the most important, arm of the federal government to
decide the question of competence between the federal government
and the cantons. The most important questions, those which make
up the backbone of a system of constitutional law, are decided by
the Federal Council, which is the executive branch of the govern-
ment, and the Federal Assembly, which is the legislature of the
Swiss federal government. And since under the Swiss Constitu-
tion, the Federal Council is not really an independent branch of
the government but merely the executive arm of the legislature,
corresponding very largely to the position of the Cabinet in the
British government, the real power of decision on this all im-
portant question of competence resides in the legislature. This is
28Artiele 3 of the Swiss Constitution provides as follows: "Les cantons
sont souverains entant que leur s uverainete n'est pas limitee par la con-
stitution federale, et, comme tels, ils exercent tous les droits qui ne sont pas
delegues am pouvoir federal."
29 Swiss Constitution, Art. 113.
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due to the fact that under the Swiss Constitution the Federal
Tribunal has no power, such as our Supreme Court has, to declare
a federal law unconstitutional, but must carry out all laws made
by the Federal Legislature. The Federal Legislature is, therefore,
the court of last resort as to what matters should be left to the
competence of the Federal Tribunal and what should be excluded
from it, - exactly the reverse from the situation in this country,
where it is the United States Supreme Court that decides this all
important question of the distribution of federal powers. The
Swiss federal legislature is in a position to determine by legisla-
tion what questions of conflict between the federal government
and the cantons should be left to determination by the Federal
Tribunal, and what questions should be determined by other
branches of the federal government. 0
The so-called Weimar Constitution of the German Republic
divides the supervision of this question of competence between the
federal legislature and a special federal tribunal, which, under the
Constitution, was to be organized under a law of the legislature.
But here again, and perhaps even more so than in the case of
Switzerland, the real power of decision is in the hands of the fed-
eral legislature. The court in question is not an ordinary court,
but a special court created for the decision of political questions,
the particular subject here under consideration are limited to
cases where there is any doubt as to whether or nwt a state law
infringes upon a federal law. Under the Constitution of .the Ger-
man Republic, no court can declare a law of the federal legislature
unconstitutional. In the nature of things, therefore, no federal
court could declare that a federal law infringes upon the rights of
a state. The only question that could come before such a court
would be whether a state law infringes upon the rights of the fed-
eral government. If there is a federal law on the subject that
settles the question, if the meaning of the law is clear. We have,
therefore, this situation: In the first place, the ordinary courts
have apparently no right to pass on any such question at all, the
question being reserved to the special tribunal contemplated by the
Constitution to be created under a law of the federal legislature.3
And the latter court is limited to passing upon one of the follow-
ing questions: (1) Whether under the Constitution, in the absence
30 See Art. 113 of the Swiss Constitution.
31 See Art. 13 and 108 of the Weimar Constitution and notes to the same in
Arndt's Edition of that Constitution.
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of any federal law, the state law would be valid; (2) whether there
is a federal law on the subject; and, (3) whether, if there be a
federal law on the subject, the state law in question is in conflict
with the same. But even with these limitations, the matter is not
left entirely to this special federal tribunal. For, under the
Weimar Constitution, the vast subject of socialization of natural
resources, and a wide power of control over the economic life of
the country generally, is committed to the federal government; and
the Constitution expressly provides that as regards this vast sub-
ject, the federal government has a direct veto over state legisla-
tion. This veto, according to the most authoritative commentators,
is to be exercised by the federal "Government", which is respon-
sible to the federal legislature.32
The Constitution of the Republic of Austria is supposed to
have been drafted by a man who was an admirer of the United
States Constitution.3 It was, therefore, to be expected that here,
if anywhere, our own manner of disposing of the problem under
consideration would have been adopted. An examination of the
Constitution of the Republic of Austria will show, however, that
while there is a certain formal imitation of our own Constitution,
the substance of its provisions are utterly at variance with our own
practice at the most crucial points. The Constitution of the Re-
public of Austria specifically provides that the ordinary courts
shall have no power to examine into the validity of laws duly pro-
claimed, 34 but it creates a special Constitutional Court to which
that function is delegated. The Constitutional Court is, however,
both in its composition and its functions, really a political body
rather than a court. It is empowered, among other things, to de-
cide upon questions of conflicting claims of jurisdiction between
administrative authorities and the ordinary as well as the admin-
istrative courts. In passing, it is well to note that the Constitu-
32Article 7 of the Weimar Constitution, Section 13, provides that the Fed-
eral Legislature has the right to legislate on "die Vergeselsehaftung Von
Naturshaetzen und Unternehmungen sowie die Erzengung, Herstellung, Ver-
teilung und Preisgestaltung wirtschcrftlicher Gleter fuer die Gemeinwirt.
schaft." Article 12 of this Constitution provides: "Gegen Landesgesteze, die
sich auf Gegenstaende des Art. 7, Ziff. 13, beziehen, steht der Reilhs-
regierung, sofern dadureh das Wohl der Gesamtheit im Reicheh beruehrt wird,
ein Einsruchsreeht zu." Commenting on this.provision Arndt says: "Dieses
Binspruchsrecht ist ein volistaendiges Veto, Darueber entseheidet kein
Geriehtshof, sondern allein die dem Reichstage verantwortliohe Reioihs.
regierung.""
33 Dr. Hans Kelsen, the noted Austrian jurist.
34Constitution of the Republic of Austria, Art. 89 (1). See also Art.
140 (4).
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tion of the Republic of Austria does not contain35 anything in the
nature of a bill of rights, and the laws of the Austrian federal
legislature cannot, therefore, be attacked on the ground of "uncon-
stitutionality" in the ordinary acceptation of the word in this
country, - that is to say, for alleged infringement of individual
rights. The most important function of the Constitutional Court
lies in the realm of the very problem here under consideration,
namely, the decision of questions of competency between the fed-
eral and state governments, including questions of conflict be-
tween federal and state legislation, as well as the infringement by
state legislation on the federal constitution. The manner of the
disposition of this problem by the Constitution of the Republic
of Austria is, therefore, of particular interest in our discussion.
The first thing to be noted in this connection is the provision
as to who may invoke the authority of the Constitutional Court by
questioning the validity of any law. On this point, the Constitu-
tion as originally adopted, provided that the authority of the Con-
stitutional Court can be invoked by a federal ministry on the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of a state law, and by a state govern-
ment on the question of the constitutionality of a federal law.3 6
These provisions proceed upon the theory that the question in-
volved is not one of individual right. Therefore, the government
whose sphere of competency has been encroached upon is the
only aggrieved party, and the only party to complain. By
an amendment passed in the year 1929 it is provided that either
of the two ordinary federal supreme courts, - the Supreme Judi-
cial Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, - may invoke
the authority of the Constitutional Court, by referring to it the
question of the constitutionality of any law which is involved in
any case before them as to the constitutionality of which the in-
quiring court is in doubt. By this amendment, the two ordinary
high courts of Austria, which are themselves arms of the federal
government, may raise the question of constitutionality for their
own enlightenment. But still, no provision for the raising of the
question by an individual; - for the notion of an individual hay-
35 This constitution ought really to be referred to in the past tense, as it
has recently been supplanted by a so-called corporate or Fascist constitution.
36Art. 140 (1) of this constitution provides that "The Supreme Constitu-
tional Court shall render judgment, on application of the federal ministry,
upon the constitutionality of state laws; on application of a state government,
upon the constitutionality of federal laws." Subdivision (2) of the same
article provides: "The ministry that makes the application must communi-
cate it immediately to the competent state government or the federal ministry,
as the case may be."
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ing the right to raise the question of the infringement by either
the federal government upon the powers of the states, or by a
state upon the powers of the federal government, was utterly
foreign to either the original drafters of this Constitution or of
those who were responsible for the amendment just referred to.
Another point, which should be considered in this connection,
is that under the provisions of this constitution, as amended and
supplemented by legislation, the government likely to be ag-
grieved by any proposed legislation, need not wait until the dam-
age is done, but may invoke the power of the Constitutional Court
in advance of the passage of such legislation. The government
likely to be affected may bring the question to an issue by attack-
ing before the Constitutional Court any "project of law destined
to be submitted to the decision of a legislative body". 37 Clearly,
this is a much more sensible way of meting the situation than our
own practice of either waiting for years before a decision can be
obtained from the United States Supreme Court on the question
of the constitutionality of a law, permitting all the harm of a possi-
bly unconstitutional law to be wrought in the meantime, or of en-
joining the operations of government, thus suspending the opera-
tion of a possibly constitutional law pending the decision.
The purely political character of the Constitutional Court,
and the utterly different point of view from which the entire sub-
ject of constitutionality is viewed in this Constitution from that
prevailing in this country, is best seen by a third provision of this
Constitution which deserves our attention. That provision has to
do with the effect of a decision of the Constitutional Court on the
law declared unconstitutional. As already pointed out, the under-
lying theory of our notion of "unconstitutionality" is that of a
contract either between the federal government and the states, or
between the individual and the government, - a contract the
violation of which makes the action of the government involved a
nullity. Under this theory, the decision of necessity goes to the
question of enactment, and a decision that a certain law is uncon-
stitutional renders it void ab initio, so that, theoretically, there
has never been such a law. Such is not the theory of "uncon-
stitutionality" under the Constitution we are now considering.
Under this Constitution, what we call the "basic law" is not a con-
tract either between the federal government and the states or
between the people and the government. The Constitutional
37Laws of 1930, art. 54.
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Courth created by this Constitution, is, therefore, not conceived,
as with us, as a court of law expounding a contract between parties,
but rather as a political Council of Revision, empowered to dis-
tribute the powers of government between the federal and state
governments in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution and
the requirements of the times. The Constitutional Court's
declaration that a law is unconstitutional, does not, therefore,
automatically render the law of no effect. When a law is held by
the Constitutional Court to be unconstitutional, the judgment of
the Court is certified to the government whose legislature passed
the law, and that government thereupon publishes a decree an-
nulling the statute. The law does not, in fact, become annulled
until such a decree of annulment is published by the government
whose law is involved. And when the law is thus annulled, its
annulment does not go back to the time of its enactment. On the
contrary, up to the time of its annulment by such decree, it is con-
sidered to have been a valid law, and everything done under it
r6mains unaffected by the decree of annulment.38 Furthermore,
the Constitutional Court is empowered to decree annulment from
a future date.3 9
It will be seen from the foregoing, that whatever resem-
blances there may be between the provisions of the Austrian
Constitution with respect to unconstitutional legislation and our
own practice on the subject, such resemblances are purely super-
ficial, and that the provisions of the Austrian Constitution proceed
upon a theory diametrically opposed to that upon which our own
practice is based. There is, however, one point at which the two
opposing theories may be harmonized, and the Austrian practice
might be adopted in this country with considerable advantage to
our system of government.
Notwithstanding our theory of the absolute nullity of uncon-
stitutional legislation, our actual practice is to the contrary, as we
have seen in the discussion of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee and as I
38 Constitution of the Republic of Austria, Art. 140 (3). These provisions
do not apply to a case, under the constitution as amended, in which one of the
ordinary Supreme Courts raises the question of constitutionality of a law
involved in a case pending before it for adjudication. In such a case, the
inquiring court determines the case before it as if the statute had never been
passed.
39 As the constitution stood before amendment, the Constitutional Court had
the right to annul as of a future date up to six months from the time of the
rendering of the decision. By an amendment passed in 1925, this period was
increased to one year.
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have shown at greater length elsewhere. 40  The fact is, that the
theory of absolute nullity is so utterly absurd that no system of
government could exist for a day were the theory to be carried
into actual practice. In practice, therefore, we have departed
from it very widely in order to avoid the chaos which Mr. Justice
Johnson said in his concurring opinion in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee must ensue if this theory be followed to its logical conclu-
sion. For instance: The United States Supreme Court has limited
its own power in this connection by declaring that it has no right
to declare a state law unconstitutional for repugnancy to the state
constitution.41 The United States Supreme Court has also held
that it will not consider the problem of constitutionality where the
party attacking the law is not an aggrieved party.42 All that is
necessary, therefore, to make our practice similar to that provided
for under the Constitution of the Republic of Austria, with respect
to the particular question here under consideration, is for the
United States Supreme Court to declare that the only really ag-
grieved party is the government whose domain has been invaded,
powers infringed, or dignity impaired. If the United States Su-
preme Court were to say tomorrow, as it should have done in 1842,
that only the federal government can be heard to complain if its
dignity has been invaded by taxing Mr. Dobbins, and that Mr.
Dobbins is, thus, not an aggrieved party, then the flimsy legal
structure of the exemption from taxation of so-called "govern-
mental instrumentalities" would fall of its own weight, and no
constitutional amendment such as was introduced by Senator Hull
40 See Boudin, The Problem of Stare Decisis in our Constitutional Theory
(1931) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 589-639; Boudin, Stare Decisis, State Constitu-
tions, and Impairing the Obligation of Contracts by Judicial Decisions (1934)
11 N. Y. U. L. Q. Ray. 31-47, 207-235.
41 Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152, 6 L. ed. 289 (1825) ; Bank of Hamil-
ton v. Lessee of Ambrose Dudley, 2 Pet. 492, 7 L. ed. 497 (1829).
42 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1923). In these
cases, the United States Supreme Court refused to consider the consitutional-
ity of the Federal Maternity Act of 1921, saying: "In the first case, the
State of Massachuetts presents no justifiable controversy entiher in its own
behalf or as representative of its citizens. The appellant in the second suit
has no such interest in the subject matter, nor is any such injury inflicted or
threatened, as will enable her to sue." On the question of the right of the
state to bring the action the Court said: "In the last analysis, the com-
plaint of the plaintiff state is brought to the naked contention that Congress
has usurped the reserve power of the several states, by the mere enactment
of the statute, though nothing has been done and nothing is to be done without
their consent." Thus, this is a clear intimation that the distribution of pow-
ers between the Federal and State governments is a matter which concerns
only the governments involved, and that this distribution of powers may there-
fore be changed by their consent.
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would be necessary in order to abate the nuisance which has be-
come so serious a menace to the health of our public finance.
VI
This question of a possible revision of our concepts of "con-
stitutionality" in the domain of the division of power between
federal and state governments is of critical importance at this time
and deserves the attention of all thoughtful lawyers. The crying
evil in the domain of taxation which has grown up since the de-
cision in Collector v. Day is only one reason why that is so. Im-
portant as that subject is, it is of comparatively minor importance
when compared with the much more serious problem presented
by the question of legislation on the subject of commerce, - in-
volving as that does the entire subject of experimental legislation
exemplified by the so-called National Industrial Recovery Act.
Unless we are definitely convinced that the economie ideas under-
lying that legislation are utterly wrong, and cannot possibly be-
come right at any future time, - in other words, unless we are
absolutely convinced that the laissez faire system is the only possi-
ble economic system, - and are, therefore, definitely committed to
a course which must bring us back to the condition of the law
which existed before any of the new experimental legislation was
passed by Congress, we must cast about for a way of revising our
old concepts upon which we based the division between interstate
and intrastate commerce, and find a method of making these new
concepts effective under the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution.
We need not go here into a discussion of the subject as to
whether or not under present-day conditions there is such a thing
as purely intrastate commerce. Whatever economists may think
on the subject, it will probably suffice for the majority of lawyers
that the Constitution says that there is such a division, and that,
therefore, this division must continue to exist. Some of us may
think that if we follow the example of the United States Supreme
Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Taney in the ad-
miralty cases, we might re-define the concept of interstate com-
merce in accordance with present-day conditions in a manner which
would not interfere with experimental legislation of the type in-
volved in the National Industrial Recovery Act and the practices
attempted to be set up thereunder. It is doubtful, however,
whether the profession or the courts could be persuaded to adopt
such a radical redefinition of commerce as would practically do
31
Boudin: State and Nation in a Federal System
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1934
32 STATE AND NATION IN A FEDE RAL SYSTEM
away with the distinction between interstate commerce and intra-
state commerce. But some such result is absolutely imperative if
experimental legislation of the type involved in the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act is to be made possible. For, clearly, the
very basis of that legislation, - that is to say, the economic theory
underlying it, - is such as to do away with the old time distinc-
tion between interstate and intrastate commerce. And the practi-
cal situations which have arisen under the codes set up under that
Act, as shown by the litigation which has come before the courts,
demonstrate to superfluity that, with the possible exception of what
is called the service trades (and there is some doubt even as to
those), there is no longer any such thing as purely intrastate com-
merce. When a manufacturer in Connecticut brings an action to
restrain the code authority in the garment industry from enforc-
ing its provision with respect to differentials in wages which places
Baltimore in the Southern Zone instead of the Northern Zone, on
the ground that the Baltimore clothing manufacturer competes
with him in the New York market, there is hardly any room left
for doubt that our notions on the subject of interstate commerce
are thoroughly antiquated and cannot stand up against the actual-
ities of present-day economic conditions.
Some means of harmonizing the Constitution with present-
day economic conditions must, therefore, be found, unless we are
resigned to give up the attempt to get out from under the depres-
sion.
Under these circumstances, I submit that the least revolution-
ary way out is to redefine not so much the concept of interstate
commerce, as the notion as to who is the "party aggrieved" in
the question of the distribution of powers of government between
Nation and State. Once we accept the opinion of the responsible
jurists who framed the Constitution of the Republic of Austria, our
troubles are largely at an end. If Messrs. Jones and Robinson
cease to be "parties aggrieved" when the federal government in-
vades the sovereignty of the States by passing a law, or permit-
ting the setting up of a code, which regulates what to Messrs.
Jones and Robinson seems to be intrastate commerce, the chances
of the law or of the codes being upset at the suit of some State are
so infinitesimal, that we would not have to lie awake of nights
worrying over the problem. The fact of the matter is, that the
States and the Nation are interested in setting up some form of
control over business which would enable us to regulate economic
matters which have hitherto been left unregulated. The difficulty
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is that present-day economic life is so complicated that there is
really no way of telling what is interstate commence and what is
intrastate commerce.43 As a result, whichever government sets up
the controls, the legislation or whatever form the controls assume,
will be attacked on the ground that the matter really belongs in
the domain of the other government. If the controls are federal
and set up under a federal law, Messrs. Jones and Robinson will
claim that the sovereignty of the States is infringed upon; while
if the individual States set up these controls, some other Jones
and Robinsons, - and not infrequently the very same ones, - will
contend that the States have no such powers, because, forsooth,
under the United States Constitution such things belong within
the sphere of competency of the federal government. The judges,
before whom these contentions come up, are of necessity at a loss
how to decide since we are dealing with abstract notions which
have no counterpart in the realities of actual life. And so long as
an individual can compel a court to decide whether a certain ec-
onomic activity belongs in either interstate commerce or intrastate
commerce, so long chaos will reign, and impede or render nugatory
43 The case of Seeling v. Baldwin, 7 F. Supp. 776 (1934), deserves particu-
lar attention in this connection. This was a suit against the Commissioner of
Agriculture of the State of New York to enjoin the Commissioner from
refusing to issue to the plaintiff a license for the sale of milk unless he com-
plied with the so-called Milk Control Act. License had been refused, or was
threatened to be refused, because the plaintiff was selling milk imported from
other states into the State of New York, in violation of the provisions of the
Milk Control Act. The milk was resold in the original cans, and the prices
paid therefor in the state from which it was imported was below the price
established for payment to the producer by the Milk Board established under
the law. The case was heard by a statutory court, and an injunction pendente
lite granted, in a very interesting opinion written by Learned Hand. Judge
Hand commences his opinion by stating that Congress had not legislated on
the subject, and but for previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
it might well be argued that Congress not having legislated on the subject,
the states were free to legislate; that the question whether the regulation in
question was a direct burden upon interstate commerce could well be doubted,
but for decisions of the United States Supreme Court to the contrary. The
question of the propriety of the legislation in itself was not doubted, as this
particular law had been approved by the United States Supreme Court in the
case of Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934). The only
question, therefore, was whether the feature attacked in this case was invalid
because it was a regulation of interstate commerce. On this question, Judge
Hand wrote: "We do not of course mean that the plan is not commendable
in itself, or that the means are not well adapted to the end. Nebbia v. New
York, supra, has authoriatively settled the state's power, and it is easy to see
how the whole scheme might be imperiled, and conceivably wrecked, unless
foreign milk, bought at cut price, could be kept out of competition with the
domestic supply. Furthermore, though a complete exclusion would give even
greater security, it might have been open to a charge of unfair discrimination,
which cannot be made as it is. The act does not try to circumscribe the 'milk-
33
Boudin: State and Nation in a Federal System
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1934
34 STATE AND NATION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM
all attempts at real experimentation in the domain of economic
legislation. The only remedy is to say to Messrs. Jones and Rob-
inson that since it is not a question of the powers of government
in general, but only as to which government should exercise the
power in question, they are not really aggrieved when either of
these governments does the job, and that the only aggrieved party
is the government whose sphere of competency is supposed to
have been invaded.
shed' as equal competition defines it; it merely prevents price-cutting through-
out its area. So put there is much to be said for the propriety of the extra-
territorial feature, and Congress inight ivell be induced to sanction it as it
stands. But that sanction is, we think, eessential to its validity." Judge
Hand also intimated that the Supreme Court might adopt a "more realistic"
canon applicable to the subject, but felt that an inferior court should not
venture to do so. "So far" said the, "as we are to have a inore realistic
canon, it must be worked out step by step in the Supreme Court."
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